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SMALL WARS JOURNAL
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© 2010, Small Wars Foundation
November 6, 2010
Contextual Truth-Telling to Counter Extremist-
Supportive Messaging Online:
The Wikileaks “Collateral Murder” Case Study
by Larisa Breton and Adam Pearson
On 5 April 2010, the website known as Wikileaks (www.wikileaks.org) posted two
videos of a U.S. Army Apache helicopter engagement that occurred on 12 July 2007, in New
Baghdad, Iraq (Christian Science Monitor, 06 April 2010). During this engagement, between ten
and 15 Iraqi insurgents were killed, two Reuters employees were killed, and two children
grievously wounded. The videos were a 39-minute unedited “research version” of the events
which we will refer to as the original version, and a 17-minute version that had been edited and
captioned by Wikileaks titled “Collateral Murder” which we will refer to as the edited version –
it is this video to which they directed public attention. The original version was classified, and it
was provided to Wikileaks in contravention of United States law. (While the Pentagon‟s
investigation of the Army personnel has been provided to the public, the video, and any other
classified American materials illicitly provided to Wikileaks, remain classified.)
Called “Collateral Murder,” the edited video garnered more than 5,000,000 views on
YouTube and was the subject of news reports and articles from around the world, most of them
derogatory in sentiment to the U.S. Army and condemnatory of perceived American action.
While the re-telling of a complex wartime engagement that raises painful questions of honor and
morality has happened before in national contexts (Taras, 1994), and international press coverage
of war is the norm, we sought to examine this instance of a press-like actor, Wikileaks, which
promulgated a narrative specifically intended to discredit American action. Whatever Wikileaks‟
true social agenda may be, the “Collateral Murder” video certainly became grist for the terrorist
mill. We examine this video in the context of Wikileaks‟ role as a press-like actor, and the role of
an individual intervention, a re-edited video posted by a private citizen to refute and to debunk
Wikileaks‟ claims about the incident.
The Collateral Murder video and an individual intervention
The same week as the “Collateral Murder” release, an individual who works near the
U.S. defense contracting complex became enraged by the Wikileaks-edited video, which he
believed would be used by extremist platforms (such as www.theunjustmedia.com) to further
harden radicalized attitudes and to recruit future terrorists online. He particularly objected to
Wikileaks‟ editing, which reduced a complex, difficult wartime engagement to a single-note
issue of cold American aggression, and resolved to act. The individual created an online identity
of a British subject called „Bob‟, which is how we will refer to him throughout this paper. Acting
as „Bob‟, he downloaded and re-edited the original video, and posted the new version on
YouTube (http://collateralmurder.wordpress.com/). In doing so, the interventionist re-pointed
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attention to the following items, which had been redacted from Wikileaks‟ edited version (U.S.
Army investigative reports, 2007):
➢ Recorded conversation from the pilots‟ transcripts in which they note steady
insurgent activity in the area of engagement throughout that day;
➢ Use of Wikileaks-originated captioning on the edited video that called attention to
Wikileaks‟ ideological agenda-items (IngerLassen, Strunck & Vestergaard, 2006, p.
237);
➢ Video of a black van that differed from the Apache-destroyed van shown at the end of
the video, which had been used to pick up and drop off insurgents throughout the day;
➢ Photographic evidence that the Reuters journalists had been photographing the
locations and positions of the Army personnel throughout the day and providing these
locations to the insurgents – one of the most ambiguous elements of the situation. The
journalists may have been knowingly aiding the insurgents by providing them U.S.
Army positions throughout the day, or they may unwittingly have been providing the
insurgents with tactical intelligence. Nonetheless, it is highly unlikely from the video
and photographic evidence that these journalists were simply in the wrong place at
the wrong time;
➢ Moreover, the journalists were not among a group of unarmed men, as the Wikileaks-
edited video suggested.
The interventionist‟s video received slightly more than 6,000 views before being flagged
by viewers and removed by YouTube for being excessively violent – while the Wikileaks-
produced videos yet remained. This was action-taken against the interventionist at the behest of
Wikileaks and its volunteer supporters. However, due to backchannel in the American defense
contracting community, „Bob‟s‟ video and his story was socialized by MountainRunner, a U.S.
blog popular with the military (www.MountainRunner.us). The story was picked up by
MyPetJawa, a U.S. right-leaning satirical blog that ridicules extremists (www.MyPetJawa.com),
and thence by nationally-televised American satirist Stephen Colbert, who drummed Wikileaks
founder Assange in an interview on his show, The Colbert Report. Colbert pointed to the
inconsistencies between the Collateral Murder (Wikileaks edited) video, the full video, and
information provided in the U.S. Army‟s investigative report. “That‟s not leaky. That‟s a pure
editorial…You properly manipulated the audience into the emotional state you want before
something goes on the air…. How can you call that Collateral Murder?” Colbert said (Colbert,
12 April 2010).
Unpacking the Interventionist’s Aims
By uploading a competing version of the Collateral Murder video, the private
interventionist „Bob‟ had three major goals, containing component goals. They were:
Counter Wikileaks’ agenda. The interventionist placed the re-edited video in public view
as an entry into the competition for general public attention and mindshare (Harris, 2004). More
specifically, „Bob‟ wished to counter Wikileaks‟ agenda that positioned its edited version of the
video as a creditable source of information about a potential war crime.
Refute specific instances of contrafactual reporting. The interventionist intended his
intervention, when viewed by the public, to introduce enough question about the facts of the
events as narrated by Wikileaks to alter the opinions of both general viewers, and viewers

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already likely to use Collateral Murder as an ideological plank to support their violent extremist
ideology. Nyhan and Reifler have shown that blog users of any political bent will seek out
political blog material that supports their extant opinion (Nyhan, B & Reifler J 2010), while
Lawrence, Sides and Farrell agree that already politically-polarized blog audiences “gravitate
toward blogs that accord with their political beliefs” (2010). „Bob‟ had a practitioner‟s
knowledge of these concepts based on his experience as an analyst, and expressed them when
speaking with the authors. He hoped that presenting competing information would help to refute
idea and opinion formation in general viewers and in those already polarized in their opinions.
Introduce doubt about Wikileaks as a purveyor of factual information. By showing
specific ways in which the Wikileaks‟ edited version of the full video had been edited to excise
pertinent visual information, the timeline manipulated, and the pilots‟ recorded conversation
about the persistent presence of insurgent activity in the area of engagement omitted, „Bob‟ first
sought to demonstrate that Wikileaks had used editing to create a narrative that supported its own
stated anti-war activist position. For example, the 17-minute Wikileaks-edited version was the
subject of a quote by Julian Assange made to American news outlet MSNBC: “[It] shows the
debasement and moral corruption of soldiers as a result of war. It seems like they are
playing video games with people's lives." Next, the interventionist intended his version of the
video to support, and to promulgate, the U.S. Army‟s investigative findings that the personnel
involved had not violated the Rules of Engagement at the time of the incident, had been
investigated, and had been cleared of wrongdoing.
Introduce doubt about the credibility of Wikileaks’ face. Additionally, „Bob‟ wished to
introduce doubt about the personal credibility of Wikileaks‟ founder, Julian Assange, that would
follow him into the future, and give audients pause before automatically buying-in to future
narratives created by Wikileaks (Dearing & Rogers, p. 51). “If we can even introduce a shred of
doubt that sticks with this story, it would be worth it,” „Bob‟ said in a conversation with the
authors.
As subsequent sections will show, the interventionist may only have been
partially successful, due to the hybrid nature of Wikileaks as a content-delivery system with
social movement attributes, the barriers-to-entry inhibiting would-be interventionists, and the
human behavior factors, articulated in political and communications theory, stacked-up against
the individual interventionist. But these factors examined against the intervention can be the
lessons-learned to form the beginning of a roadmap for other successful interventions.
What is Wikileaks? Brief history
Wikileaks, a website containing leaked documentation from governments and private
organizations all over the world, bills itself as an anti-war activism website. A nonprofit
organization arranged online in “wiki” format, it provides a searchable trove of leaked
documents that cover classified material, unclassified but sensitive material, unclassified material
such as reports from the U.S. Congressional Research Service, and confidential materials such as
membership lists and papers from parliamentarians‟ divorce proceedings.
Wikileaks rose to prominence in 2007 when it published a leaked Kroll report detailing
money-laundering involving former Kenyan president Daniel arap Moi and other irregularities
surrounding the Kenyan presidential election (www.wikileaks.org), thus establishing its
reputation as an organization able to procure and promulgate information to the public and to

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expose hitherto unknown transactions. It also achieved notoriety for publishing personal email of
American vice-presidential candidate Sarah Palin. Two other examples are pertinent in setting-up
Wikileaks as an organization with an expository function. In the first, Wikileaks published a
leaked copy of a World Health Organization draft of drug development for developing nations
(Mullard, 2010) that had been provided to a consortium of pharmacological companies for an
early review. Proponents of the provision argued it was fairly standard practice for the private
sector to stay close to policy developments, while critics cried foul and argued that this type of
sharing allowed Big Pharma to wield undue influence on policy (Mullard, 2010). In the second,
in 2008 Wikileaks published a leaked copy of the controversial British National Party‟s
membership list (Computer Fraud & Security, 2008). There was furor on both sides of the
disclosure.
In all of these cases, it is meaningful that the existence of the leaked information, itself,
and the act of the leaking, led to press coverage and interpretation of these events, with included
commentary from proponents and opponents of the events at hand, by national and international
press. Over time, by following a course of action notable for its similarity to standard advertising
campaign practice of using frequency and interruption to garner share of mind to make its way
by direct and indirect pathways (MacInnes & Jaworski, 1989), Wikileaks has been able to
establish its near-ubiquity as a go-to source for revelatory information drawn from multiple
domains. (So much so that in at least one instance, the United Nations itself has used Wikileaks-
purveyed information in a report as a citation to provide information about wartime activity and
refugee status in Afghanistan (Giustozzi, 2009)). Thus consumers of information, by mental
synecdoche, are to understand that press coverage of Wikileaks postings means something
heretofore hidden, thus controversial, has been revealed.
Using press-delivery format with an agenda-setting function
In both „making the news‟ and setting up its own brand identity as a creator of news
(Griffin, 2003, p. 394), Wikileaks has moved aggressively to set the frame of its politicized
communications to the public (Altheide & Snow, 1991, Griffin, 2003) as news, as well as to use
its mass reach based on previous releases, to set its agenda to the public (Dearing & Rogers,
1996). Blumler and Gurevich write: “Over the past quarter of a century, the media have
gradually moved from the role of reporting on and about politics, „from the outside‟ as it were,
to that of being an active participant in, shaping influence upon, indeed an integral part of, the
political process” (1995, p. 3). Similarly, Harris writes that “our experience with media is a
major way that we acquire knowledge about the world” but “the act of transmitting that
knowledge may itself become the event of note” (Harris, pp. 2-3). The shape, or frame, of news
(or news-like content) delivery increasingly defines and drives content (Altheide & Snow, 1991)
– or as Marshall McLuhan famously observed, the medium has become the message. We, the
public, know this intuitively, but it becomes increasingly apparent when we observe complex
events like the 12 July 2007 engagement in New Baghdad, Iraq, issued in pre-digested format
with embedded political meaning ascribed within the messaging. “An impoverishing way of
addressing citizens about political issues has been gaining an institutionally rooted hold that
seems inherently difficult to resist or shake off,” write Blumler & Gurevich (1995, p. 203).
Wikileaks‟ brand identity, that of controversy, expository function, and attendant publicity,
establishes the tone and tenor of its communications, while it reduces ambiguity by simplifying
the story.

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In its tone, and also its habits, Wikileaks seeks to set a public agenda. Long known as
agenda-setting by the press (Griffin, 2003, Harris, 2004; Dearing & Rogers, 1996; Soroka,
2002), the frequency with which a media outlet delivers on a particular theme, as well as
elements that it chooses to promote, will have an effect on public perception. For example, the
press can create a climate of fear around a specific crime wave although the danger to the public
is statistically no different than normal (Muzzatti & Featherstone, 2007). However, Wikileaks
differs in substantive ways from mainstream news outlets, in that it does not attempt to cover a
broad spectrum of newsworthy events but instead only focuses on events it deems controversial,
pushes forward information that has been revealed to it, and assertively announces and protects
the anonymity of its sources and associates while widely promulgating the information it has
collected under its remit as an “activist” organization.
Spots or stripes? Asymmetric delivery power and social-movement attributes
Thus far, we have examined the ways in which Wikileaks behaves like a press outfit in
that it makes information widely available to the public, attempts to create its own frame (or
paradigm) to ascribe meaning to this information, and attempts to set an agenda with the
information it chooses to promulgate. However, Wikileaks also demonstrates the attributes of a
social movement in the ways it communicates to, and with, its audience and associates. White
(Lee, 1995, p. 93) writes:
Social movements, in order to strengthen identification and loyalty, tend to introduce
and legitimate an alternative pattern of communication which, relative to the
dominant pattern, insists that all members have a right to obtain and make
communicative inputs when they wish, that members may participate in all phases of
the collective communication decision-making process, that members may engage in
„horizontal‟ communication between individuals and groups without being vetted by
authorities, that communication be dialogical in the sense that members have a right
to reply and expect a direct reply.
In addition to democratizing information by allowing a flat pool of leakers, informants,
and associates able to participate on the site, Wikileaks frequently leverages its position by
relying on the horizontal, emotional relationships that bind online communities, knowing that
adherents and devotees will tweet, post, and blog about Wikileaks-offered topics. This has the
effect of amplifying the reach, and the resonance, of Wikileaks‟ topics, or is what the military
calls an effects-multiplier. Consider the difference between this practice and that of a mainstream
news outlet such as CNN, which has democratized information to a lesser extent by allowing
individual readers to post comments at the end of a news story, or providing space for i-reporters
online, which are caveatted [mediated] by an editor as not having been fact-checked. Consider,
also, a second example of democratized, unmediated communication with social movement
attributes: Facebook, with 500,000,000 members, which The Economist pointed out has now
achieved “country-like features” in which the “horizontal ties” between members and groups
may someday “matter more” to members than their ties to a specific geopolity (24 July 2010).
The strong social ties among and around Wikileaks adherents provide Wikileaks with an
asymmetric strength. That is to say, its ability to wield influence is greater than it should be,
based on its size and its actual function as a repository.
So in Wikileaks we have something like a social movement that behaves like a press
outlet in that it 1) sets an agenda for what the public should think about; 2) drives its agenda

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aggressively by framing all issues it covers in the same way; and 3) maximizes the “human
interest” aspect of its coverage by emphasizing the event‟s personal impact, the dramatic, using
an observable event, and emphasizing this event‟s “deviance” from social norms (Harris, 191-
192). To this explosive mixture of press and social-movement agendas, add net-enabled speed
for near real-time updating, and the many-to-many horizontal communications capability of
social networking entities such as Twitter, “part blog part e-mail,” and Facebook , “an intimate,
continuing conversation between friends,” (The Economist, 30 January 2010, p. 8) as
accelerants.
This provides Wikileaks with the asymmetric power of rapid, unmitigated delivery to a
mass following which can be reasonably relied-upon to believe what Wikileaks tells them – and
could eventually be called upon to act in ways more onerous than flagging a competitor‟s video
product on YouTube. This is no specious claim: one small and relatively innocuous example
should suffice. In August 2010 an American teenager hacked one of the social-messaging
accounts of an associate of international pop star Justin Bieber, and boasted about these
accomplishments online. Bieber responded immediately by posting the teen‟s phone number on
Twitter and announced it as his own. An avalanche of phonecalls and text messages ensued,
costing the teen‟s family more than $25,000USD in charges (Chicago Tribune Online Edition,
20 August 2010).
Therefore, Wikileaks is more than an information-source for ideologically polarized blog
readers (Lawrence, Sides & Farrell, 2010) and a touchstone for those with hardened anti-Western
attitudes (Nyhan & Reifler, 2010). It also may be a catalyst, or an instigator, for as-yet-seen
asymmetric actions-taken online by those who support its aims.
Effects and implications for individual interventionists: barriers to entry
We believe it is an understatement to say that Wikileaks is polemic, as are its individual
releases. Why, then, do not more people opposed to Wikileaks‟ releases intervene, and
particularly why not in the instance of “Collateral Murder,” which was beyond incendiary to
supporters of the American military? The interventionist, „Bob‟, provided the authors with what
he perceived were the mechanical, cultural, and professional barriers-to-entry that may have
dissuaded other would-be interventionists from taking action.
Mechanically, while the file size of the original and edited Wikileaks videos were not
onerous and could be downloaded to an ordinary commercial computer, the file translation
software required to unlock Wikileaks‟ encoding, as well as the processing time required (about
eight hours) and what „Bob‟ referred to as “fiddling with it” (and what we describe as a robust
set of video editing skills) are the first barriers that may hold back other interventionists. Skill in
manipulating gateway software to mask individual identity, as well as the tradecraft to
successfully hide one‟s true identity (should one wish to hide it) are not typical skills, so those in
the private sector wishing to intervene may abandon attempts at any of the afore-mentioned
gates.
Next, potential language barriers add the cultural dimension when an interventionist
would like to address a different audience.
Professionally, video processing time while on the clock and commercial workplace
security requirements may prevent interventions. Last, individuals working in and around the

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intelligence community and the military are likely to be dissuaded by U.S. security requirements
even though they may possess the requisite languages, tradecraft and equipment to intervene.
Polarized opinion, spiral of silence, and ‘backfire’ inhibit direct interventions
From the mechanical, cultural, and professional inhibitors to direct intervention,
we turn to the likely efficacy of individual interventions and examine why „Bob‟s‟ attempt may
not have been entirely successful. As noted in earlier sections, blog readers in particular tend to
gravitate towards blogs that support their extant political beliefs, although more politically-active
readers may read more widely (Lawrence, Sides & Farrell, 2010). Therefore, blog readers
supportive of Wikileaks are less likely to seek out information that runs counter to their beliefs,
and be less likely to come across alternative viewpoints in their general reading. This self-
reinforcing polarization may be one key factor to explain why „Bob‟s‟ intervention garnered
lower traffic before it was pulled down by YouTube. People simply weren‟t out there in the
blogosphere, looking for something to balance what they‟d just seen in the Wikileaks-edited
video.
Next, when an issue attracts mass attention, and a prevailing opinion begins to
form, those exposed to the issue and the prevailing opinion become increasingly unlikely to
publicly express a dissenting opinion, for fear of social ostracization and/or reprisal. Known as
spiral of silence theory, developed by Noelle-Neumann, it is especially important in the context
of this examination to emphasize that people are more likely to publicly express the prevailing
opinion, whatever their private opinion may be (Jeffries, Nuendorf & Atkin, 1999). In the case of
the Wikileaks-edited video, which received global media coverage and a preponderantly anti-
American sentiment expressed therein, the spiral of silence theory suggests that even those with
doubts are unlikely to express them publicly (Jeffries, Nuendorf & Atkin, 1999). Diminishing
returns are likely to result from an individual intervention, in that the competing argument is
unlikely to be picked up, repeated, or supported by others if it is the minority argument. Any
interventionist going against what the public perceives to be as popular opinion will be running
uphill, as their message is less likely to be repeated.
The third human factor to inhibit individual interventions is the old maxim,
“Please don‟t confuse us with the facts.” New research by Nyhan and Reifler shows that people
holding firm opinions do not, in fact, wish to have them refuted (Nyhan & Reifler, 2010). When
refuted, the refutation is likely to result in “backfire,” the strengthening of the original opinion.
“Ideological subgroups failed to update their beliefs when presented with corrective information
that runs counter to their predispositions. Indeed….we find that corrections actually strengthened
misperceptions among the most strongly committed subjects,” Nyhan and Reifler wrote.
The conflation of already-polarized opinion, the spiral of silence, and the
likelihood that direct refutations will backfire create a formidable obstacle to successful direct
intervention by individuals. „Bob‟s‟ intervention, standing alone, may not have had the intended
effect in reaching or influencing the opinions of those who use Wikileaks‟ messaging to support
extremist views. However, the intervention was not a complete failure, as the issues raised in the
intervention seemed to have serendipitously made their way into mass media via The Colbert
Report, which may have introduced the subject of inaccuracies in the “Collateral Murder” video
to portions of the public who were not yet of strong opinion on the subject. Colbert‟s treatment
of Assange may also have introduced the beginnings of doubt about the credibility of Wikileaks
the outfit or Assange its founder.

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Conclusion
Wikileaks, by communicating edited versions of events likely to be picked up and used
by extremists to support their ideological opposition to the West, poses a complex problem-set to
would-be interventionists. It positions itself as a press-like entity, while piggybacking on the
mainstream press and individuals to promulgate its releases. It also operates like a social
movement, in that it democratizes information and relies on strong social bonds within its
adherents. An individual interventionist will face numerous challenges to rebut memes
introduced in this manner, including mechanical and professional barriers-to-entry. More
importantly, however, the public‟s predisposition to seek out opinions with which it already
agrees; spiral-of-silence effects that inhibit the expression of dissenting opinions; and factual
“backfires” that actually reinforce strongly-held opinions; are likely to render individual
interventions ineffective. Without a mass-media platform, or the ability to seed the intervention
into audiences that will take it viral, the individual intervention is likely to remain a lone voice in
the blogosphere.
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Larisa Breton is a strategic communications engagement and influence specialist with a wealth
of US Government, commercial digital, and traditional multimedia experience. From her roots
as part of the digital vanguard that revolutionized Internet usage in the early 1990s, Larisa
pioneered digital commerce to Fortune 100 companies. Since transitioning to Strategic
Communications, Larisa has helped to frame strategic and tactical programs, and program
execution, on complex and challenging engagement projects conducted worldwide.
Adam Pearson is a Cyber Investigator with Striker Pierce Investigations, LLC, and has over 12
years experience with the Intelligence Community in both the military and civilian world. He is
proficient in multiple languages and is a subject matter expert in Strategic Influence and
Information Operations.
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